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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wilhelmina Dery has lived in her home in the city of New London, Connecticut, 
since she was born in 1918.1  Now, after the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
                                                                
*J.D. expected, May 2007, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State 
University; B.A. summa cum laude, John Carroll University (History and Economics).  I 
would like to thank my family for all their love and support, especially my wife Mary Pat. 
1Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).  Wilhelmina’s husband, Charles, 
also has lived in the house for approximately sixty years.  Id. 
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in Kelo v. City of New London,2 she and her fellow petitioners3 who own property in 
the Fort Trumbull area of New London will be forced to sell their properties to the 
city.4  While Dery’s and the other petitioners’ properties were not “blighted or 
otherwise in poor condition,”5 the Court determined that the city’s proposed use of 
eminent domain was constitutional under the Fifth Amendment,6 and that the 
condemnation of petitioners’ properties could proceed solely because they 
“happen[ed] to be located in the development area.”7  So, instead of being able to 
live the remainder of her life in her only home, Dery must move to make way for a 
city-sponsored economic development project.8 
Like New London, several other urban cities across the country have been using 
government-sponsored economic development projects to revitalize their economies 
and to slow population out-migration.9  For instance, the city of Lakewood, Ohio, an 
inner-ring suburb10 of Cleveland, has long been losing population and jobs to 
sprawling suburbs farther west of both Cleveland and Lakewood.11  In 2003, in an 
attempt to reverse this growing trend, Lakewood sought to redevelop one of its 
neighborhoods to create new homes, a shopping district, and business opportunities 
with the hopes of making the city more desirable.12  However, because several 
landowners refused to sell their properties to Lakewood and because the city could 
not condemn the properties through eminent domain at that time, the redevelopment 
project dissolved and the city continues to lose population and jobs to outer-ring 
suburbs.13 
                                                                
2Id. at 469. 
3There were a total of nine petitioners, who owned fifteen properties in Fort Trumbull, that 
filed suit challenging the city’s use of eminent domain.  Id. at 475. 
4Id. at 483-84.  Petitioners must sell their properties to the New London Development 
Corporation (NLDC), a private non-profit entity established by the City of New London “to 
assist the City in planning economic development.”  Id. at 473. 
5Id. at 475. 
6U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
7Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475. 
8Id. at 490. 
9See generally Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Development Tool:  
A Proposal To Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 901. 
10Inner-ring suburbs are older suburbs that are immediately adjacent to major cities.  
ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION:  THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 4-5 (2000).   
11V. David Sartin, Eminent Domain Policy Angers Some, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, 
Ohio), Oct. 26, 2003, at S6.  Inner-ring suburbs like Lakewood are declining across the 
country, as they “los[e] residents and businesses to fresher locations on a new suburban edge.”  
DUANY ET AL., supra note 10, at 4-5. 
12Sartin, supra note 11. 
13V. David Sartin, Strike Two for West End Proposal: Issue 47 Loses Again in Latest 
Tally; Recount To Come Next Month, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 22, 2003, at B1.  
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The stories of property owners like Dery and of cities like Lakewood bring to the 
forefront the problems inherent in cases involving the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use 
Clause.14  On the one hand, private property rights in this country are highly 
respected and are usually accorded the utmost deference.15  Conversely, urban cities 
across the country often cannot compete with sprawling suburbs, and the problems of 
urban sprawl continue to grow unabated.16 
This Note will analyze the two opposing interests of property owners and of 
cities in the context of the Supreme Court’s Public Use Clause jurisprudence and 
show that while the Court’s decision in Kelo may have diminished property rights, 
the decision could render an overriding positive impact on combating urban sprawl.  
Part II defines urban sprawl and identifies some of its associated costs.  Part III 
briefly describes Public Use Clause jurisprudence prior to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Kelo.  Part IV discusses the Court’s opinion in Kelo and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence.  Part V examines the substantial criticism of Kelo and the legislative 
responses to the ruling.  Part VI then suggests how the Court’s decision in Kelo 
ultimately found the right balance between the competing interests of property rights 
protection and an urban city’s ability to compete against sprawling suburbs.  Finally, 
Part VII concludes the Note by reiterating that cities like New London and 
Lakewood need the power of eminent domain for their “economic survival.”17  
II.  URBAN SPRAWL AND ITS ASSOCIATED COSTS 
A.  What Is Sprawl? 
To properly analyze the costs and problems associated with urban sprawl, it is 
first necessary to determine exactly what constitutes “sprawl.”  Unfortunately, the 
term historically has not been well-defined.18  In fact, sprawl often has been 
                                                          
In a referendum election, residents in the city of Lakewood voted against authorizing public 
financing and the use of eminent domain for the redevelopment project.  Id.  
14U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
15See Michael J. Coughlin, Comment, Absolute Deference Leads to Unconstitutional 
Governance:  The Need for a New Public Use Rule, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (2005) 
(mentioning how political theorists “viewed the protection of property rights as one of the 
central purposes of government”); Doug Doudney, Editorial, Ominous Implications of the 
Kelo Decision:  America Is Outraged, and It’s Easy To Understand Why, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
(Fla.), July 8, 2005, at A23 (“Property rights aren’t imbued by government[;] they are inherent 
natural human rights.”). 
16See DUANY ET AL., supra note 10; Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an 
Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 301 (2000); see also infra Part II. 
17Avi Salzman & Laura Mansnerus, For Homeowners, Frustration and Anger at Court 
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Thomas J. Londregan). 
18See Amy Helling, Local and Comparative Perspectives on Managing Atlanta’s Growth:  
Advocate for a Modern Devil:  Can Sprawl Be Defended?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1063, 1064 
(2001).  The word “sprawl” as a planning term did not arise until approximately the late 1950s 
and early 1960s.  Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate 
in the United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 137, 140 (1998).   
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attributed with an “I-know-it-when-I-see-it quality to it,” rather than a specific, 
concrete definition.19   
More recently, however, several scholars have sought to clearly define the 
amorphous concept of sprawl by delineating its predominant characteristics.20  For 
instance, in 1998, the Federal Transit Administration and the Transportation 
Research Board of the National Research Council sponsored a comprehensive study 
of sprawl and determined that sprawl referred “to a particular type of suburban 
peripheral growth” epitomized by a number of identifiable elements.21  The elements 
consisted of residential and/or nonresidential development that is 1) relatively low-
density, 2) noncontiguous and unlimited, 3) spatially segregated, and 4) automobile-
dependent.22  Similarly, another recent study, which outlined sprawl’s more easily 
identifiable characteristics, specified that there were five basic components of sprawl 
and emphasized that each of these components were strictly segregated from one 
another.23  The components included 1) residential subdivisions, 2) strip shopping 
centers, 3) office parks, 4) under-utilized civic institutions, and 5) extensive 
roadways necessary to connect the other four components.24   
By combining these general elements and components, scholars today have 
fashioned several working definitions of sprawl.  For example, one straightforward 
description of sprawl is the “outward spread of commercial, industrial, and 
residential development into open spaces located on the fringes of urban centers.”25  
By contrast, a more precise definition that accounts for sprawl’s rather ambiguous 
nature is that sprawl constitutes “low-density, land-consuming, automobile-
dependent, haphazard, non-contiguous (or ‘leapfrog’) development on the fringe of 
settled areas, often near a deteriorating central city or town, that intrudes into rural or 
other undeveloped areas.”26  While this latter conception of sprawl is more detailed, 
for purposes of this Note and to focus on the adverse impact of sprawl on cities and 
                                                                
19Timothy J. Dowling, Point/Counterpoint:  Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, 
and the Fifth Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000); see also ROBERT W. 
BURCHELL ET AL., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, TCRP REPORT NO. 39, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL—
REVISITED 11 (1998) (noting that even an authoritative study on sprawl in 1974 did not 
explicitly define the term “sprawl”).  Alluding to sprawl’s unspecified nature, some scholars 
have suggested that one possible cause of its continued growth over the years has resulted 
from “sprawl’s seductive simplicity, the fact that it consists of very few homogeneous 
components . . . which can be arranged in almost any way.”  DUANY ET AL., supra note 10, at 
5. 
20See BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 6-8; DUANY ET AL., supra note 10, at 3-20; 
DONALD C. WILLIAMS, URBAN SPRAWL: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (2000). 
21BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 6-8. 
22Id. 
23DUANY ET AL., supra note 10, at 5-7. 
24Id. 
25WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 247.     
26Dowling, supra note 19, at 874.  See also Chris J. Williams, Comment, Do Smart 
Growth Policies Invite Regulatory Takings Challenges?  A Survey of Smart Growth and 
Regulatory Takings in the Southeastern United States, 55 ALA. L. REV. 895, 899 (2004).   
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inner-ring suburbs, sprawl will be referred to as any development that moves 
population and jobs “from older, urban cores to newer, less densely-populated”27 
suburbs at the outer edges of major metropolitan areas.28 
B.  The History and Growth of Urban Sprawl 
Urban sprawl in the United States has been a pervasive aspect of the country’s 
development.29  While some commentators believe that sprawl development patterns 
have existed since the nation’s founding30 and that urban sprawl merely represents 
the results of a free market economy,31 there is overwhelming evidence that 
government policies actually have encouraged sprawl development.32  In particular, 
federal government policies in the areas of housing and transportation have favored 
suburban growth at the expense of central cities.33  For instance, federal government 
housing policies, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage 
insurance program, which only guaranteed home loans in low-risk suburban areas, 
and the Housing Act of 1937, which encouraged public housing to be built in major 
cities, combined to move “middle-class families out of cities both by subsidizing 
migration to suburbs, and by turning cities into dumping grounds for the poor.”34  
Likewise, government transportation policy has encouraged suburban migration by 
subsidizing the cost of driving and by constructing new highways.35  Consequently, 
the government’s road-building efforts have “degraded cities and accelerated 
suburban sprawl in two ways:  by the physical destruction of city neighborhoods and 
by making suburban life more convenient.”36  Thus, urban sprawl “does not reflect 
                                                                
27Lewyn, supra note 16, at 301. 
28See BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 6-8; Lewyn, supra note 16, at 301.  An example 
of sprawl development would be a suburb, such as Avon Lake, Ohio, located in a county west 
of Cleveland.  Avon Lake has segregated housing subdivisions, strip shopping centers, 
isolated office parks, and wide roads. 
29Lewyn, supra note 16, at 301. 
30WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 2 (“In many respects, present day urban development 
patterns are merely an outgrowth of trends set in motion over the previous 200 years.”).  
Williams writes that profitable land speculation and an anti-urban bias contributed to the early 
roots of sprawl development.  Id. at 2-4. 
31Lewyn, supra note 16, at 304 (citing several conservative scholars).  One proponent of 
sprawl development has indicated that “sprawl is not the work of bad or stupid people.  
Rather, it is the natural result of years of pursuing improvements in travel and communication, 
making previously remote locations increasingly accessible.”  Helling, supra note 18, at 1065.  
32Dowling, supra note 19, at 880; Lewyn, supra note 16, at 304-05. 
33Lewyn, supra note 16, at 305.  Lewyn also discussed how governmental education 
policies have encouraged urban sprawl.  See id. at 322-29. 
34Id. at 305. 
35Id. at 312-22. 
36Id. at 316.  Another scholar has noted that “nearly eighty-five percent of federal 
transportation money ‘paves the way for sprawl.’”  Dowling, supra note 19, at 880 (quoting 
Pietro S. Nivola, Make Way for Sprawl, WASH. POST, June 1, 1999, at A1). 
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choices made in an unregulated marketplace but choices heavily influenced by huge 
government subsidies that encourage sprawl.”37 
In fact, as the government began implementing these huge subsidies in the latter 
half of the twentieth century,38 urban sprawl in the United States increased 
dramatically, as more and more people and jobs relocated from central cities to 
distant suburbs.39  For instance, at the close of World War II, approximately seventy 
percent of metropolitan Americans lived in central cities, but today central-city 
populations account for only a little more than thirty percent of metropolitan 
Americans.40  Since 1980, suburban populations have increased ten times faster than 
central-city populations, as now a total of over sixty percent of Americans live in 
suburbs outside of major cities.41  And from 1960 to 1990, the amount of developed 
land in metropolitan areas has “more than doubled,” even though the population has 
increased by less than half this rate.42  Furthermore, as people have moved into the 
suburbs, the jobs have followed.43  Approximately ninety-five percent of the more 
than fifteen million office jobs created in the 1980’s were established in the suburbs, 
and today nearly two-thirds of all new jobs are located in suburban areas.44  
Moreover, the population and job trends of urban sprawl show no signs of slowing in 
the near future, as Americans continue to relocate to new homes and workplaces on 
the edges of metropolitan cities.45 
C.  The Costs of Sprawl 
As urban sprawl has increased in the United States, the costs of sprawl have 
become more clear and significant.46  In general, the costs of sprawl are defined as 
“the resources expended relative to a type, density, and/or location of 
                                                                
37Dowling, supra note 19, at 880. 
38See Burchell & Shad, supra note 18, at 140 (discussing how the federal government 
housing and transportation programs in the 1950s and 1960s “helped push development far 
beyond the nation’s central cities”). 
39Lewyn, supra note 16, at 301. 
40Id.  Central cities, such as Cleveland, Buffalo, and St. Louis, have experienced drastic 
declines in population.  Id. at 301-02.  Since 1950, the populations of Cleveland and Buffalo 
have decreased by more than 45%, and St. Louis has lost more than 60% of its residents.  Id.   
41WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 11. 
42Id. at 12.  For example, metropolitan New York City’s population increased by 8% as its 
area grew by 65%; metropolitan Chicago’s population increased by 4% as its area grew 46%; 
metropolitan Cleveland’s population decreased by 11% as its area grew 33%.  Id.  
43Lewyn, supra note 16, at 302. 
44Id. 
45WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 1.  Scholars have emphasized that sprawl has now become 
an institutional aspect of American culture:  “Suburbanization and sprawl are as ingrained in 
our national myth as baseball and apple pie once were.”  Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. 
Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183, 186 (1997).  “Sprawl has been 
promoted by social forces, which reflect the desire for a rural lifestyle coupled with an urban 
income.”  Id. 
46See id.; Williams, supra note 26, at 899-900; Dowling, supra note 19, at 875-79.  
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development.”47  Specifically, the costs of sprawl have contributed to numerous 
societal problems, including the loss of productive farmland, excessive dependency 
on automobiles, pollution, onerous infrastructure costs, and the destruction of our 
central cities and inner-ring suburbs.48  For example, sprawl destroys nearly one 
million acres of farmland each year, and now approximately eighty percent of our 
fruits, vegetables, and dairy products are threatened because of sprawl development 
patterns.49  In addition, sprawl has led to excessive dependency on personal 
automobiles, which has caused substantial traffic congestion, higher energy costs, 
and large increases of air pollution from the additional driving miles.50 
Yet, perhaps the most threatening cost of sprawl is its damaging effect on central 
cities and inner-ring suburbs.51  For instance, as former Vice President Al Gore has 
commented, sprawl “has left a vacuum in the cities and suburbs which sucks away 
jobs . . . homes and hope; as people stop walking in downtown areas, the vacuum is 
filled up fast with crime, drugs, and danger.”52  Thus, as more and more people and 
jobs move to the metropolitan edges of cities, the country’s poorest neighborhoods 
get left behind, and central cities become even less desirable.53  For those residents, 
sprawl “exacts a price from families by providing fewer employment opportunities, 
resulting in lower income in education levels, and provides fewer positive role 
models for children living in central cities.”54  In fact, as sprawl leaves a void in 
urban cores and fosters racial and economic segregation,55 “sprawl systematically 
deprives inner city residents of opportunities and adequate services, which stimulates 
the anti-social behavior suburban America rejects.”56  Furthermore, this resultant 
                                                                
47BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 8. 
48Dowling, supra note 19, at 875-79.  Another scholar has noted that the costs of sprawl 
include “‘physical, monetary, temporal, and social/psychological’ costs that have contributed 
to at least six major crises” for American metropolitan regions:  1) the deterioration of existing 
built-up areas (cities and first- and second-ring suburbs); 2) environmental degradation—loss 
of wetlands and sensitive lands, poor air and water quality; 3) overconsumption of gasoline 
energy; 4) fiscal insolvency, transportation congestion, infrastructure deficiencies, and 
taxpayer revolts; 5) agricultural land conversion; and 6) unaffordable housing.  Williams, 
supra note 26, at 899 (quoting Burchell & Shad, supra note 18, at 137); see also Freilich & 
Peshoff, supra note 45, at 184. 
49Dowling, supra note 19, at 875. 
50Id. at 875, 879; see also Lewyn, supra note 16, at 303. 
51Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 189 (“Sprawl’s costs are most pronounced for those 
residents remaining in the central city and first-ring suburbs.”); see also Lewyn, supra note 16, 
at 303. 
52Judith Haveman, Gore Calls for ‘Smart’ Growth; Sprawl’s Threat to Farmland Cited, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1998, at A17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Al Gore).   
53See Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 189-190; see also Dowling, supra note 19, at 
874. 
54Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 189-90. 
55Robert W. Burchell, Economic and Fiscal Costs (and Benefits) of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 
159, 168 (1997). 
56Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 190. 
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void in central cities and inner-ring suburbs decreases the tax-paying ability of their 
residents and causes fiscal problems and eventually budget cuts for programs that 
such residents desperately need.57  As one scholar has noted, metropolitan 
communities are now divided, as “decreasing demographic diversity, geographic 
separation, and escalating costs due to sprawl-borne social problems minimize the 
social responsibility bond that should exist between central cities and suburban 
communities.”58 
With sprawl, the country’s sense of community and its historic and cultural 
heritage are gradually being replaced by new highways and big-box stores placed in 
the middle of what was once precious farmland.59  As people move away from older, 
more established city neighborhoods into newer suburban areas, there seems to have 
been an interpersonal disconnect  “evidenced by reported decreases in volunteerism, 
a general lack of commitment by individuals to join community-based organizations, 
and decreases in donations to charities.”60  Suburban citizens often feel the need for 
two incomes to maintain a certain standard of living, and other societal interests have 
taken a lower priority.61  As one scholar has observed, sprawl has contributed to a 
significant decline in the quality of life and there is now a real “danger of forgetting 
what life was like without [sprawl],” where we sadly “come to accept a ninety-
minute daily commute, a smoggy horizon, lifeless central cities . . . as the natural 
order of things.”62 
Thus, while some argue that sprawl has benefits, such as increasing a region’s 
housing supply and providing more affordable housing,63 the overwhelming evidence 
suggests that sprawl is “a problem in need of a solution.”64  One commentator has 
warned that if a solution is not quickly found, our nation “can look forward to 
increased pollution, longer commutes, more economic depression in our central 
cities, and further loss of our cultural heritage and sense of community.”65 
III.  PUBLIC USE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO KELO 
Recently, governments have begun attempting to find a solution to sprawl by 
using the power of eminent domain, which has raised questions about the proper 
scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use Clause.66  The Public Use Clause grants 
governments the power to condemn private property but restricts that power by 
stating that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
                                                                
57Burchell, supra note 55, at 168. 
58Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 190. 
59See Dowling, supra note 19, at 874; Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 190. 
60Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 190. 
61Id. 
62Dowling, supra note 19, at 874. 
63See Helling, supra note 18, at 1065-74. 
64Williams, supra note 26, at 900; see Dowling, supra note 19, at 887. 
65Dowling, supra note 19, at 887. 
66See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also infra Part VI. 
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compensation.”67  Throughout the country’s history, there has been a substantial 
amount of litigation regarding the meaning of the Public Use Clause, and courts have 
subjected the clause to varying interpretations.68 
A.  Narrow Interpretations 
In the years immediately following the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the 
United States Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the Public Use Clause, requiring 
that the government’s power of eminent domain be limited to instances where the 
condemned land was taken for use by the general public.69  During that time, eminent 
domain could be used for public projects, such as “mills, private roads, and the 
drainage of private lands.”70  However, the Court strictly prohibited a legislature 
from using the power of eminent domain to take property from one private party to 
give to another.71  For instance, in the 1795 case Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance,72 
the Court emphasized the paramount rights of property ownership and ruled that 
eminent domain should be exercised only in “urgent cases,”73 and that it was difficult 
to imagine such an urgent case “in which the necessity of a state can be of such a 
nature as to authorize or excuse the seizing of landed property belonging to one 
citizen, and giving it to another citizen.”74  Likewise, in the 1798 case Calder v. Bull, 
the Court again stressed that the Public Use Clause explicitly banned takings that 
effectively transferred private property to another citizen.75  Justice Chase wrote, 
“[A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B:  It is against all reason and 
justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers . . . .”76 
This narrow interpretation of the Public Use Clause continued into the nineteenth 
century.  For example, in the 1848 case West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,77 two justices 
                                                                
67U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  The entire clause is referred to as the 
Takings Clause, but the phrase “for public use” is referred to as the Public Use Clause.  See 
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984). 
68See discussion infra Part III.A–C. 
69See Coughlin, supra note 15, at 1007-10; Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent 
Domain Law:  An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of 
the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 290-93 (2000); Peter J. Kulick, Comment, 
Rolling the Dice:  Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate a “Public-Private Taking” 
A Proposal To Redefine “Public Use”, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 639, 646-48. 
70Glen H. Sturtevant, Jr., Note, Economic Development as Public Use:  Why Justice 
Ryan’s Poletown Dissent Provides a Better Way to Decide Kelo and Future Public Use Cases, 
15 FED. CIR. B.J. 201, 206 (2005). 
71See Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). 
72Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 304. 
73Id. at 311. 
74Id. 
75Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388. 
76Id. 
77W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). 
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issued concurring opinions stressing that property could not be taken simply to 
transfer ownership from one private entity to another.78  Justice McLean stated that 
such an action “the State cannot do.  It would in effect be taking the property from A 
to convey it to B.  The public purpose for which the power is exerted must be real, 
not pretended.”79  Similarly, in the 1876 decision Kohl v. United States, the Court 
determined that eminent domain was “a right belonging to a sovereignty to take 
private property for its own public uses, and not for those of another.”80 
B.  Broad Interpretations 
However, in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court interpreted the Public Use 
Clause much more broadly, granting legislators wide discretion to determine what 
actions constitute a “public use.”81  For example, in Berman v. Parker, the Court in 
1954 found that there was no violation of the Public Use Clause when it held that the 
federal government could condemn property located in a blighted neighborhood, 
despite the fact that the property was later to be leased or sold to another private 
entity.82  The Berman Court deferred to Congress’s determination that redeveloping a 
depressed area of Washington, D.C. to eliminate and to prevent slum housing was a 
public purpose within the government’s police power.83  The Court wrote, “If those 
who govern [D.C.] decide that [Washington] should be beautiful as well as sanitary, 
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.  Once the object is 
within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the power of eminent 
domain is clear.”84  The Court then refused to review Congress’s development plans 
on a property-by-property basis,85 noting that “the means of executing the project 
[were] for Congress and Congress alone to determine.”86 
Likewise, in 1984, the Court reaffirmed a deference to legislative 
pronouncements regarding the Public Use Clause in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff.87  There, the Court declared that Hawaii’s plan to take title from private 
                                                                
78Id. at 537-38 (McLean, J., concurring); id. at 543-44 (Woodbury, J., concurring). 
79Id. at 537 (McLean, J., concurring). 
80Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876). 
81See Coughlin, supra note 15, at 1010-18; Jones, supra note 69, at 293-96; Kulick, supra 
note 69, at 647-52. 
82Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954). 
83Id. at 32-33.  The Court wrote, “It is within the power of the legislature to determine that 
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced 
as well as carefully patrolled.”  Id. at 33. 
84Id. 
85Id. at 34-36.   
86Id. at 33.  The Court further wrote, “Once the question of the public purpose has been 
decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a 
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”  
Id. at 35-36. 
87Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984).  “[T]he Court has made 
clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a 
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landowners and then transfer it to lessees “to reduce the concentration of ownership 
of fees simple in the State” satisfied the Public Use Clause.88  The Court stated that 
“[t]he mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in the 
first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a 
private purpose.”89  Instead, relying on the findings of the Hawaiian state legislature, 
the Court declared, “[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated 
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”90 
One other landmark case that broadly interpreted the Public Use Clause in the 
twentieth century was the recently overturned case Poletown Neighborhood Council 
v. City of Detroit.91  In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court applied state law and 
held that Detroit could use the power of eminent domain to acquire a large tract of 
land so that General Motors could build a car assembly plant.92  The Michigan court 
rejected the landowners’ arguments that there was a legal distinction between “public 
use” and “public purpose” and that the city was unconstitutionally using eminent 
domain merely to transfer property from one private citizen to another.93  Instead, the 
court noted that “[t]he power of eminent domain is to be used in this instance 
primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment 
and revitalizing the economic base of the community.  The benefit to a private 
interest is merely incidental.”94  The court then refused to subject the city’s findings 
to meaningful judicial review, citing Berman and writing that “when a legislature 
speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms ‘well-nigh conclusive.’”95 
C.  Towards a Narrow Interpretation? 
Yet, as alluded to earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court in 2004 overruled 
Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.96  In Hathcock, Wayne County sought to 
use the power of eminent domain to transfer land to a private developer who was 
going to construct a large business and technology park.97  The court began its 
analysis of the Michigan Constitution’s Public Use Clause by noting that the clause 
                                                          
public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”  Id. at 241 (quoting 
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)). 
88Id. at 231-32. 
89Id. at 243-44. 
90Id. at 241.  The Court added, “When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means 
are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings . . . 
are not to be carried out in the federal courts”  Id. at 243. 
91Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), 
overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
92Id. at 457. 
93Id. at 458. 
94Id. at 459. 
95Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
96Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765. 
97Id. at 769. 
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was not an absolute prohibition against transferring condemned property to private 
entities but did foreclose the ability of governments to transfer “condemned property 
to private entities for a private use.”98  Citing Justice Ryan’s dissent in Poletown, the 
Hathcock majority outlined three categories in which the transfer of a condemned 
property constituted a public use:  1) when the transfer involves a “‘public necessity 
of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable,’”99 2) “when the private entity remains 
accountable to the public in its use of that property,”100 and 3) “when the selection of 
the land to be condemned is itself based on public concern.”101  Applying this test, 
the Michigan court ruled that the proposed business and technology park did not fall 
within any of the three categories and held that the public use requirement of 
eminent domain was not satisfied.102  The court then determined that the Poletown 
majority wrongly concluded that “a generalized economic benefit was sufficient . . . 
to justify the transfer of condemned property to a private entity,”103 and announced 
that Poletown was thereby overruled.104 
Thus, before Kelo, there seemed to be a consensus among courts that 
governments could use the power of eminent domain to transfer blighted property 
from one private entity to another.105  Yet, the issue still remained whether 
governments had the authority to use eminent domain to revitalize non-blighted, 
economically-depressed neighborhoods.106  So, in Kelo, the Court was faced with a 
choice between favoring a broad interpretation of the Public Use Clause as advanced 
in Berman and Midkiff,107 or instead favoring an interpretation that was more 
narrowly-tailored as suggested by the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock.108 
                                                                
98Id. at 781. 
99Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).  The Court wrote, 
“Justice Ryan listed ‘highways, railroads, canals, and other instrumentalities of commerce’ as 
examples of this brand of necessity.”  Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., 
dissenting)).   
100Id. at 782 (citing Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 479 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).  The Court 
elaborated that this second category would satisfy the “public use” requirement when the 
“public retained a measure of control over the property.”  Id. 
101Id. at 782-83 (citing Poletown 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).    The primary 
example of this third category would be condemnation for the purposes of blight removal.  See 
id. at 783. 
102Id. at 783-84. 
103Id. at 786. 
104Id. at 787. 
105See discussion supra Part III.B.-C. 
106See Kimberly J. Brown, Recent Decisions Affirm Use of Eminent Domain for 
Economic Development (Aug. 2005), http://www.bricker.com/publications/articles/870.asp. 
107See discussion supra Part III.B; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
108See discussion supra Part III.C; see also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765. 
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IV.  KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON 
A.  Background 
In a divisive five to four decision with one concurrence and two dissenting 
opinions, the United States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London once again 
reaffirmed its deference to legislative pronouncements and construed the Public Use 
Clause broadly.109  In Kelo, the city of New London, Connecticut, was a “distressed 
municipality” that had been experiencing a prolonged period of economic decline.110  
By 1998, New London had an unemployment rate that was approximately double the 
state of Connecticut’s, and its population was at its lowest level since 1920.111  In 
response to the city’s deteriorating economic conditions, the city council of New 
London approved a development plan that proposed to redevelop a ninety-acre 
section of the city to create jobs, increase tax revenues, and revitalize the 
economically-depressed city.112  The council designated the New London 
Development Corporation (“NLDC”)113 to obtain the land needed for the 
development plan, authorizing the NLDC “to purchase property or to acquire 
property [through] eminent domain.”114  The NLDC successfully negotiated and 
purchased most of the property within the redevelopment area, but nine property 
owners refused to sell, and the NLDC instituted eminent domain proceedings to 
acquire the remaining parcels.115 
The nine property owners responded by bringing a claim in Connecticut state 
court, asserting that the takings of their properties would violate the Public Use 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.116  The New London Superior Court conducted a 
seven-day bench trial and granted a permanent restraining order forbidding the 
taking of certain parcels.117  The lower court prohibited the taking of properties 
where the NLDC was to construct a park or marina, but it permitted the takings 
where the NLDC was to develop office space.118  Both the city and the property 
owners appealed, and the Connecticut Supreme Court, over three dissenting 
justices,119 reversed in part and ruled that all of the city’s proposed takings 
                                                                
109See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
110Id. at 473.  In 1990, the state of Connecticut had labeled New London a “distressed 
municipality.”  Id. 
111Id.  For instance, “[i]n 1996, the Federal Government closed the Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center, which had been located in the Fort Trumbull area of the City and had 
employed over 1,500 people.”  Id. 
112Id.  
113The NLDC is a private non-profit organization.  Id.  
114Id. at 475. 
115Id. 
116Id. 
117Id. at 475-76. 
118Id. at 476. 
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constituted a public use under both the Federal and State Constitutions.120  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “to determine whether a city’s 
decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the 
‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth Amendment”121 when “there [was] no 
allegation that [the] properties were blighted or otherwise [undesirable].”122 
B.  The Majority Opinion 
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court in the narrow five to four decision 
affirming the Connecticut Supreme Court.123  Justice Stevens began his analysis by 
noting that two opposing situations were clear under Public Use Clause 
jurisprudence.124  First, the government “may not take the property of A for the sole 
purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just 
compensation.”125  Second, by contrast, the government “may transfer property from 
one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking . 
. . .”
126
  Yet, Justice Stevens observed that neither of those situations governed the 
city of New London’s proposed takings.127  Instead, he indicated that the dispositive 
inquiry was “whether the City’s development plan serve[d] a ‘public purpose’” 
within the Supreme Court’s historically broad interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment.128 
                                                          
119Id. at 477 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587-88 (Conn. 2004) 
(Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).  The 
dissents in the Connecticut Supreme Court wanted to impose “a ‘heightened’ standard of 
judicial review for takings justified by economic development.”  Id. (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d 
at 587 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  “Although they agreed that the 
plan was intended to serve a valid public use, they would have found all the takings 
unconstitutional because the city had failed to adduce ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the 
economic benefits of the plan would in fact come to pass.”  Id. (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d at 588 
(Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
120Id. at 476.   
121Id. at 477. 
122Id. at 475. 
123Id. at 470. 
124Id. at 477. 
125Id. 
126Id.  Justice Stevens added that “the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-
carrier duties is a familiar example.”  Id. 
127Id.  Justice Stevens wrote that New London’s development plan was not enacted “‘to 
benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.’”  Id. at 478 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 469 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).  New London’s plan also was “not a case in which the 
City is planning to open the condemned land—at least not in its entirety—to use by the 
general public.”  Id. 
128Id. at 480.  Justice Stevens wrote, “[W]hen this Court began applying the Fifth 
Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more 
natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”  Id. (quoting Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. 
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896)). 
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Justice Stevens then cited both Berman and Midkiff and indicated that the Court 
often has deferred to legislative determinations finding a “public purpose.”129  Justice 
Stevens noted that this deference has allowed governing bodies to be flexible and to 
respond effectively to ever-changing conditions and circumstances.130  Justice 
Stevens wrote, “For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely 
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures 
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings 
power.”131 
Applying these principles, Justice Stevens found that the city of New London’s 
judgment should be accorded deference and that the city’s development plan 
satisfied a “public purpose.”132  Although there was no suggestion that any of the 
properties were “blighted or otherwise in poor condition,”133 Justice Stevens wrote 
that the city’s finding that the area was “sufficiently distressed to justify a program 
of economic rejuvenation” should be entitled to the Court’s deference.134  He also 
added that deference was appropriate in this case, because the takings “would be 
executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan” and that the lower 
courts had found “no evidence of an illegitimate purpose.”135  Thus, by emphasizing 
judicial deference and the factual background of the case, Justice Stevens reasoned 
that the “comprehensive character of the [city’s] plan, the thorough deliberation that 
preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of [the Court’s] review” demonstrated 
that the takings were justified under the Fifth Amendment.136 
Consequently, Justice Stevens rejected the property owners’ argument that the 
Court “adopt a new bright-line rule [declaring] that economic development does not 
qualify as a public use.”137  Justice Stevens also rejected the owners’ alternative 
argument that the public benefits of economic development takings should be proved 
with a “reasonable certainty.”138  Justice Stevens countered that both rules would be 
contrary to the Court’s precedents.139  Instead, Justice Stevens reiterated the 
appropriateness of judicial deference in cases involving the Public Use Clause by 
quoting the Court in Midkiff:  “‘When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its 
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the 
                                                                
129Id. at 480-81.  
130Id. at 483. 
131Id. 
132Id. at 484. 
133Id. at 475. 
134Id. at 483. 
135Id. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005)). 
136Id. at 484. 
137Id. 
138Id. at 487. 
139Id. at 484, 487-88. 
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wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of 
socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.’”140 
Justice Stevens then concluded the majority opinion by further stressing the 
Court’s limited role in this case and how the Court’s authority “extend[ed] only to 
determining whether [New London’s] proposed condemnations [were] for a ‘public 
use’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”141  
Justice Stevens observed that while the majority found that the city’s takings 
satisfied the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, the Court was still 
aware of the plight of the petitioners and “the hardship that condemnations may 
entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation.”142  Accordingly, Justice 
Stevens noted that the Supreme Court’s protections were merely a baseline and that 
states were free to impose further “public use” requirements.143  He wrote, “We 
emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”144  In fact, Justice Stevens 
recognized that “the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote 
economic development [were] certainly matters of legitimate public debate,”145 and 
subsequently, this controversial issue properly should be resolved in the legislative 
branch.146 
C.  Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Kennedy, the fifth and deciding vote to rule in favor of the respondent 
city of New London, joined the opinion for the Court but wrote separately to add 
several observations.147  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy emphasized that under 
the Public Use Clause, courts should not blindly accept a legislature’s determination 
but instead should engage in a “meaningful rational basis review”148 and “should 
strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private 
party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”149  Under this standard, he 
noted that a court “confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible 
favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review the 
                                                                
140Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984)). 
141Id. at 489-90. 
142Id. at 489. 
143Id.  
144Id. 
145Id.  In footnote 24 of the Kelo opinion, Justice Stevens mentioned several arguments for 
both sides of the issue.  Id. at 489 n.24.  
146See id. at 488-89. 
147Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
148Id. at 492. 
149Id. at 491. 
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record to see if it has merit,”150 even though the court should still presume that a 
government’s actions served a reasonable public purpose.151 
Agreeing with the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the petitioners’ 
argument that there should be a bright-line prohibition or a presumption against 
takings for the purpose of economic development under the Public Use Clause.152  
Touting the advantages of redevelopment projects, he wrote, “A broad per se rule or 
a strong presumption of invalidity . . . would prohibit a large number of government 
takings that have the purpose and expected effect of conferring substantial benefits 
on the public at large.”153  However, Justice Kennedy added that a court, in certain 
circumstances, probably should impose a more demanding standard of review “for a 
more narrowly drawn category of takings.”154  While Justice Kennedy explicitly 
declined to identify such categories,155 he wrote, “There may be private transfers in 
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute 
that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the 
Public Use Clause.”156 
In Kelo, Justice Kennedy determined that the takings of petitioners’ properties 
did not create such a risk of impermissible favoritism and that his more stringent 
standard should not be applied to the city of New London’s actions.157  Justice 
Kennedy then highlighted five illustrative factors that demonstrated why a more 
demanding standard was not appropriate in Kelo.158  First, the takings in New 
London “occurred in the context of a comprehensive development plan.”159  Second, 
this comprehensive development plan was implemented to rectify a “serious city-
wide depression.”160  Third, the “projected economic benefits” of the development 
plan could not be “characterized as de minimus.”161  Fourth, the “identity of most of 
the private beneficiaries were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans.”162  
Fifth, the city of New London “complied with elaborate procedural requirements that 
facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.”163  In essence, 
                                                                
150Id. 
151Id. 
152Id. at 493. 
153Id. at 492. 
154Id. at 493. 
155Id.  Justice Kennedy wrote, “This is not the occasion for conjecture as to what sort of 
cases might justify a more demanding standard.”  Id. 
156Id.  
157Id. 
158Id.  Justice Kennedy wrote, “[I]t is appropriate to underscore aspects of the instant case 
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based on these five factors, which some commentators now believe constitutes the 
test for permissible “public purpose” private takings,164 Justice Kennedy believed 
that New London’s actions were reasonable and that the takings were properly 
justifiable under a meaningful rational basis review.165  
V.  CRITICISMS OF KELO AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
The Court’s majority opinion in Kelo, and to some extent Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence, has generated a significant amount of criticism and debate.166  First, in 
two separate dissenting opinions, Justice O’Connor167 and Justice Thomas168 
passionately argued that the majority’s decision improperly applied precedent and 
has essentially rendered the Public Use Clause meaningless.169  Then, in the months 
following the ruling, several commentators have criticized that the Court has greatly 
diminished private property rights and has given too much authority to local 
governments.170  As a result, mounting public pressure has influenced federal and 
state legislatures to enact several bills restricting the use of eminent domain.171 
                                                                
164See id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (mentioning Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as 
a “yet-undisclosed test”). 
165Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy wrote, “In sum, while there may 
be categories of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so 
prone to abuse, or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should 
presume an impermissible private purpose, no such circumstances are present in this case.”  
Id. 
166See Richard Epstein, Kelo: An American Original:  Of Grubby Particulars & Grand 
Principles, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 355, 355 (2005) (“The American public has found few cases in 
the past 50 years as riveting as the ongoing saga in Kelo v. City of New London.”); see also 
Judy Coleman, Outlook, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 
2005, at B2 (discussing why “Kelo incited a hostile reaction”); Craig Gilbert, Public-Use 
Ruling Has Political Backlash; Loss in Court Gives Law’s Opponents Help in Legislatures, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2005, at A1 (“The outcry over Kelo has been fast and 
unflagging, with politicians of all stripes assailing the decision and drafting bills to curb the 
use of eminent domain.”); Charles Hurt, Senators, Property Owners Review Kelo; 
Relationship Between American Dream, Eminent Domain Debated, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2005, at A4 (discussing a bill proposed by Texas Republican Senator Jon Cornyn that would 
prohibit federal funds from being used in projects that utilize eminent domain for economic 
development); Diane Mastrull, Eminent Domain Ruling’s Backlash, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 
14, 2005, at A1 (discussing how the Court’s decision created a “nationwide panic attack”); 
Michael May, Editorial, Facts About Eminent Domain Should Stop the Hysteria, CAPITAL 
TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Aug. 3, 2005, at 11A (discussing “the post-Kelo hysteria”); Peter J. 
Smith, Opinion, Understanding “Kelo”:  Why Justice Souter Should Be Praised, UNION 
LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Aug. 3, 2005, at A9 (“The reaction to the Court’s decision was 
swift and almost universally negative.”). 
167Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
168Id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
169See id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
170See Editorial, A Sad Day for Property Rights, HARTFORD COURANT, June 24, 2005, at 
A10 [hereinafter Editorial, A Sad Day for Property Rights] (“[T]he ruling is dangerous and 
should raise the hackles of all property owners.”); Doudney, supra note 15 (“The Kelo ruling 
throws [property] rights out the window and demonstrates that our government has gotten out 
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A.  The Dissenting Opinions 
1.  Justice O’Connor’s Dissent 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice 
Thomas, wrote a vigorous dissent to the Court’s opinion in Kelo.172  Justice 
O’Connor began the dissent by stating her fundamental objections to the majority’s 
decision.173  She asserted that the Court’s ruling has violated the longstanding 
constitutional principle that a legislature cannot use the power of eminent domain to 
take property from A and give it to B.174  She also observed that with its decision, the 
Court has now subject all private property to being taken and transferred to other 
private parties under the guise of economic development, thus jeopardizing the 
relevancy of the Public Use Clause.175  Justice O’Connor wrote, “To reason . . . that 
the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private 
property render economic development takings ‘for public use’ is to wash out any 
distinction between private and public use of property—and thereby effectively to 
delete the words ‘for public use’” from the Fifth Amendment.176 
Justice O’Connor then crafted a detailed argument to support her objections to 
the majority’s opinion.177  First, Justice O’Connor recited the facts of Kelo, and 
instead of emphasizing the economic troubles of New London, she underscored the 
plight of the Fort Trumbull property owners.178  She sympathetically portrayed the 
petitioners, by stressing how the properties were well-maintained and by noting how 
long some of the owners had lived in their homes.179  O’Connor claimed that the 
petitioners were not holdouts and that they did “not seek increased compensation, 
                                                          
of control.”); Richard A. Epstein, Opinion, Supreme Folly, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, at A14 
(“The Court could only arrive at its shameful Kelo ruling by refusing to look closely at past 
precedent and constitutional logic.”); Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, Your Home Can Be Pfizer’s 
Castle, S.F. CHRON., June 30, 2005, at B9; see generally Castle Coalition, Citizens Fighting 
Eminent Domain Abuse, http://www.castlecoalition.org/ (last visited May 1, 2007); Inst. for 
Justice, Private Property Rights, http://www.ij.org/private_property/index.html (last visited 
May 1, 2007). 
171See Castle Coalition, Legislative Center, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/ 
index.html (last visited May 1, 2007). 
172Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
173Id. 
174Id.   
175Id.  Justice O’Connor wrote,  
Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to 
being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be 
upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems 
more beneficial to the public—in the process.  
Id. 
176Id. 
177See id. at 494-505. 
178See id. at 494-96. 
179See id. at 494, 501. 
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and none [was] opposed to new development in the area.”180  Instead, she wrote that 
the property owners’ opposition was merely “in principle:  They claim that the 
NLDC’s proposed use for their confiscated property is not a ‘public’ one for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”181 
Justice O’Connor next wrote that this claim of petitioners, whether economic 
development takings were constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, “present[ed] 
an issue of first impression” for the Court.182  She distinguished Berman and Midkiff, 
by noting that “in both cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating 
the existing property use was necessary to remedy [a] harm.”183  As such, the takings 
were justified “in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in 
Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth.”184  Thus, she wrote, 
“Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the 
property was turned over to private use.”185  By contrast, in Kelo, Justice O’Connor 
emphasized that the petitioners’ properties were well-maintained and not the source 
of any social harm, so that the takings did not achieve any direct public benefit.186  
Instead, it was merely a “bare transfer from A to B for B’s benefit”187 that should 
have been ruled unconstitutional under the Public Use Clause.188 
Justice O’Connor went on to add that the majority’s opinion and Justice 
Kennedy’s “special emphasis on facts peculiar” to Kelo was misguided and would 
not serve as a practical limitation on legislatures’ power to use eminent domain for 
economic development.189  Because Justice O’Connor felt that the Court had 
significantly stretched the meaning of public use, she believed that none of the facts 
could “blunt the force”190 of the holding in Kelo and that the Court had abandoned its 
judicial duty.191  O’Connor wrote: 
If legislative prognostications about the secondary public benefits of a new use 
can legitimate a taking, there is nothing in the Court’s rule or in Justice Kennedy’s 
gloss on that rule to prohibit property transfers generated with less care, that are less 
                                                                
180Id. at 495-96. 
181Id.  
182Id. at 498. 
183Id. at 500. 
184Id. 
185Id.  Justice O’Connor also noted, “Berman and Midkiff hewed to a bedrock principle 
without which our public use jurisprudence would collapse:  ‘A purely private taking could 
not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose 
of government and would thus be void.’”  Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 469 U.S. 
229, 245 (1984)).  
186Id. at 500-01. 
187Id. at 502. 
188Id. at 498. 
189Id. at 503. 
190Id. at 504. 
191Id. at 497, 504. 
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comprehensive, that happen to result from less elaborate process, whose only 
projected advantage is the incidence of higher taxes, or that hope to transform an 
already prosperous city into an even more prosperous one.192 
O’Connor maintained that despite the deferential role the Court should play in 
allowing legislatures to determine “what governmental activities will advantage the 
public,”193 it was the Court’s duty to be “[a]n external, judicial check on how the 
public use requirement is interpreted, however limited.”194 
Therefore, as a result of the Court’s apparent abdication of its responsibility in 
Kelo, Justice O’Connor predicted that there would be perilous consequences for 
American society.195  Because of the Court’s opinion, Justice O’Connor believed that 
all property in the United States was now subject to being taken by federal and state 
governments.196  She wrote, “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.  
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any 
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”197 Furthermore, Justice 
O’Connor felt that the dire effects of the majority’s decision would not be dispersed 
randomly across the country’s population, but instead would have a disparate impact 
on the nation’s poor, while simultaneously providing another opportunity for the 
rich.198  She wrote, “The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with 
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large 
corporations and development firms.  As for the victims, the government now has 
license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more.”199 
2.  Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
Justice Thomas, in his separate dissenting opinion, also reiterated how the 
majority’s decision would benefit the rich at the expense of disadvantaged 
Americans.200  While he emphasized that the Court should return to the original 
meaning of the Public Use Clause,201 Justice Thomas noted that the consequences of 
the majority’s ruling would “fall disproportionately on poor communities.”202  He 
                                                                
192Id. at 504. 
193Id. at 497. 
194Id. 
195See id. at 503-05. 
196Id. at 504-05. 
197Id. at 503. 
198Id. at 505. 
199Id. 
200Id. at 505, 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
201See id. at 505-21.  Justice Thomas criticized the majority’s decision: “If such ‘economic 
development’ takings are for a ‘public use,’ any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public 
Use Clause from our Constitution, as Justice O’Connor powerfully argues in dissent. I do not 
believe that this Court can eliminate liberties expressly enumerated in the Constitution . . . .”  
Id. at 506 (citations omitted). 
202Id. at 521. 
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wrote, “Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands 
to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.”203  
Justice Thomas then cited a study that demonstrated how government urban renewal 
projects more often than not destroyed poor neighborhoods, and in particular, mostly 
minority-populated communities.204  In fact, Justice Thomas pointed out that “[o]ver 
97 percent of the individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the ‘slum-
clearance’ project upheld by [the] Court in Berman were black.”205  Rather than 
attempting to rectify or protect against these injustices, Justice Thomas felt that the 
majority’s deferential standard actually encouraged politically powerful groups to 
continue to “victimize the weak” to generate profits.206  Accordingly, Justice Thomas 
believed that, contrary to the views in the majority opinion, the Public Use Clause 
should serve as a strict limitation on governments to ensure the protection of 
“‘discrete and insular minorities.’”207 
B.  Popular Responses 
Prompted by the two dissenting opinions,208 people across the nation have been 
outraged by the Court’s decision in Kelo.209  In the days following the ruling, polls 
showed that nearly eighty-nine percent of Americans were against using eminent 
domain for economic redevelopment,210 as opposition to Kelo seemed to unite both 
liberals and conservatives.211  Citizens of all political affiliations questioned how the 
Court could so easily disregard private property rights and essentially authorize 
                                                                
203Id.  
204Id. at 522 (citing BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALAYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW 
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 17 (1989)).  Justice Thomas also specifically mentioned urban 
renewal projects in St. Paul, Minnesota and Baltimore, Maryland, that “destroyed 
predominantly minority communities.”  Id.  
205Id. 
206Id. 
207Id. at 521 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).   
208See Doudney, supra note 15 (“Every American needs to take five minutes this week to 
read the dissenting opinions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Clarence Thomas.”); 
Jonathan Gurwitz, Editorial, Eloquent Dissent Explains Gravity of Eminent Domain, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 13, 2005, at 7B (“O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo . . . is a clear 
warning for all American citizens and a wake-up call for lawmakers in state capitols and in 
Washington.”). 
209See Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In the Name of Economic Development:  Reviving 
“Public Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of 
New London, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 227-28 (2005). 
210Id. at 228. 
211See Kristyna C. Ryan, Private Property, Public Benefit:  Economic Redevelopment and 
the Power of Eminent Domain, CBA RECORD, Nov. 2005, at 50.  Ryan wrote, “To 
conservative factions, Kelo represents an expansion of governmental power.  To liberal 
factions, Kelo represents the worst of rent-seeking politics where the powerful and wealthy 
may triumph over the common man.”  Id. 
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governments “to seize your bedroom—and kitchen, parlor, and dining room—and 
then hand your precious home over to a corporation.”212 
Critics also questioned how the Court could grant so much discretion to local 
governments, especially when the ruling seemed to create perverse incentives.213  
One commentator observed, “It should be obvious that when wealthy developers and 
the local government politicians they help put in office join forces in exploiting the 
Kelo precedent, every homeowner and property holder of ordinary means is 
potentially at risk.”214  And for what?  Opponents of the decision emphasized that 
economic development takings are merely based on uncertain future benefits,215 or 
typically some “vague promise.”216  Furthermore, critics note that unfortunate 
property owners, who are uprooted from their homes and businesses against their 
will, are only entitled to “just compensation.”217  This payment is usually measured 
as the fair market value of the condemned property, which many believe is not 
enough to “mak[e] the individual landowner whole.”218 
However, because of the large public disapproval against Kelo, cities have been 
hesitant to initiate economic development takings, and some existing projects have 
even been suspended.219  In fact, the city of New London has not yet forced Mrs. 
Dery or any of the petitioners to move, as “elements of the project have been 
effectively paralyzed since the Court ruling prompted a political outcry.”220  Groups, 
                                                                
212Saunders, supra note 170. 
213Rosa Brooks, Editorial, It’s Open Season on Private Property, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 
2005, at B13; Robert J. Caldwell, Opinion, Property Wrongs:  A Supreme Blunder, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., July 3, 2005, at G-1. 
214Caldwell, supra note 213.  Another commentator wrote, “Developers are salivating at 
the thought of all the profitable real estate they may now be able to snatch up with a little help 
from their pals on the city council.”  Brooks, supra note 213. 
215See Fuhrmeister, supra note 209, at 209.  Fuhrmeister wrote, “When property is taken in 
the name of economic development, it is significantly more uncertain as to how, when, and if 
a pubic benefit will be realized.”  Id. 
216Editorial, A Sad Day for Property Rights, supra note 170. 
217U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
218Epstein, supra note 170; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“So-called ‘urban renewal’ programs provide some compensation for 
the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands 
to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes.”); 
Fuhrmeister, supra note 209, at 220 (“Constitutionally mandated just compensation is unlikely 
to be enough to remedy the loss of [condemned] property.”). 
219See T.R. Reid, Missouri Condemnation No Longer so Imminent; Supreme Court Ruling 
Ignites Political Backlash, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A2 (“The popular backlash has 
slowed or blocked many pending projects, as developers, their bankers and local governments 
suddenly face public furor.”). 
220William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A1.   
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such as the Institute for Justice and the Castle Coalition, have continued to actively 
publicize the issue and have placed considerable pressure on legislatures to act.221 
C.  Legislative Responses 
In the first few months after Kelo, both Republican and Democratic legislators222 
across the country have acted and have proposed a number of bills that would restrict 
the use of eminent domain.223  For example, the United States House of 
Representatives, which had approved a nonbinding resolution condemning the 
majority’s decision one week after its ruling,224 passed a bipartisan bill in November 
2005 entitled the Private Property Rights Protection Act.225  The bill, if approved by 
the Senate and signed by the President, would withdraw all federal economic 
development funding from states and municipalities that used the power of eminent 
domain to transfer property from one private party to another.226  Similarly, as of 
November 2005, there were more than thirty states considering bills that would 
prohibit the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment, and Alabama and 
Texas already had enacted such legislation.227 Clearly, federal and state legislators 
have not wasted any time to follow the majority opinion’s advice228 and to provide 
further safeguards to the baseline protection of property under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Public Use Clause.229 
                                                                
221See Inst. for Justice, supra note 170; Castle Coalition, supra note 170.  One activist, in a 
publicity stunt, has even attempted to condemn Justice Souter’s 200-year-old farmhouse in 
Weare, New Hampshire, so that the property could be used for a luxury hotel.  Brooks, supra 
note 213. 
222Gilbert, supra note 166 (“The outcry over Kelo . . . has been fast and unflagging, with 
politicians of all stripes assailing the decision and drafting bills to curb the use of eminent 
domain.”). 
223See Gilbert, supra note 166; Kenneth R. Harney, On Capitol Hill, a Move To Curb 
Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at F1; Mastrull, supra note 166; Jim Siegel, Taft 
Halts Eminent Domain Land Grabs Until At Least 2007, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 2005, 
at 1A; see also Castle Coalition, supra note 171. 
224H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (“Expressing the grave disapproval of the House of 
Representatives regarding the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Kelo v. 
City of New London that nullifies the protections afforded private property owners in the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
225H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).  The bill passed by a vote of 376 to 38.  Harney, supra 
note 223. 
226Harney, supra note 223.  This funding, which would be withheld for two years, 
represents “a large pot of money for most localities and states.”  Id.  There is a similar bill that 
originated in the Senate and was introduced by Senator Jon Cornyn.  See Hurt, supra note 166. 
227Harney, supra note 223.  See also Castle Coalition, supra note 171.  In Ohio, Governor 
Bob Taft recently signed a law that placed a one-year moratorium on the use of eminent 
domain for economic development.  Jim Siegel, supra note 223.  
228See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (“We emphasize that 
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of 
the takings power.”). 
229See Mastrull, supra note 166. 
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VI.  THE PROPER BALANCE:  RESPECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMBATING 
URBAN SPRAWL 
Yet, before the federal government and additional states rush to enact such 
“knee-jerk” legislation,230 lawmakers should reassess the Court’s decision in Kelo.  
While the majority opinion may have diminished private property rights under the 
federal Constitution, the Court’s ruling was justified, because the decision could 
render an overriding positive impact on combating urban sprawl.  By recognizing 
that the use of eminent domain for economic development was an area of “legitimate 
public debate,”231 the Court ultimately struck the proper balance between the 
divergent interests of property right protection and an urban city’s ability to 
redevelop and compete against sprawling suburbs. 
 
A. Eminent Domain as a Solution to Sprawl 
 
As mentioned, urban sprawl is a major problem in our country, and solutions are 
needed.232  The power of eminent domain, if used effectively by major cities and 
inner-ring suburbs, can produce significant benefits for urban areas and can be part 
of the solution to reduce sprawl.233 
One of the primary reasons for the sustained growth of suburban sprawl is that it 
is easier to develop land in rural areas as opposed to building in urban cities.234  In 
rural areas, developers usually can acquire the large tracts of land necessary for 
development projects because they generally only have to negotiate with a few 
property owners.235  By contrast, developers planning a project in urban cities are 
often forced to deal with numerous property owners to assemble a requisite amount 
of land.236  Consequently, several market failures confront prospective city 
developers, making it extremely difficult for the private sector to redevelop urban 
areas.237  Some of the market failures include the problems of assembling a “critical 
mass of land in the face of holdouts,” dealing with absentee landowners, obtaining 
                                                                
230See id. 
231Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
232See discussion supra Part II. 
233See Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground:  Using Eminent Domain for 
Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1854-55 (2005); Terry Pristin, 
Connecticut Homeowners Say Eminent Domain Isn’t a Revenue-Raising Device, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 2004, at C8 (“Environmental groups say that eminent domain powers must sometimes 
be used to promote ‘smart growth’—that is, denser development in older neighborhoods—as a 
means of reducing suburban sprawl.”). 
234See Gallagher, supra note 233; see also BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 27 
(discussing how farmland is perfect for development also because it’s generally flat and the 
cheapest land available). 
235See Brief of the Respondents at 34, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
(No. 04-108), 2005 WL 429976; Gallagher, supra note 233. 
236See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 235, at 34. 
237See Brief of the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 19, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166931. 
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unclouded property titles, and managing the legal risks related to redeveloping sites 
that are often contaminated “brownfields.”238 
Probably the most obstructive market failure threatening private-sector city 
redevelopment is the problem of “holdouts.”239  Holdouts are individuals who own 
property within proposed redevelopment sites and who refuse to negotiate or sell to 
the developer, thus impeding the project.240  Such individuals realize that their land is 
necessary for the project to proceed, and they “have an incentive to hold out for a 
higher selling price than fair market value.”241  Holdout property owners who 
recognize their monopolistic position “can greatly increase the price of acquiring 
land for development projects,” or may even defeat a project altogether if one owner 
refuses to sell at any cost.242  For instance, one study has noted that in land assembly 
situations, holdouts who eventually sold their properties usually received as much as 
twenty-six percent above fair market value, compared to an average of only an eight 
percent market premium for owners who were among the first to sell.243  Thus, 
because the problem of holdouts is particularly acute in urban areas, where 
                                                                
238Timothy J. Dowling, Saving a City, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at 54.  In urban areas, 
private developers also may face the problems of dilapidated streets and other infrastructure 
that must be improved before redevelopment.  Id.  In addition, some existing businesses in 
cities purposely leave nearby properties vacant to preclude “competitors from entering the 
market.”  Brief of the National League of Cities, supra note 237.  
239See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 235, at 33-35; Brief of the National League of 
Cities, supra note 237, at 19-21; Gallagher, supra note 233, at 1854; Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 65 (1986). 
240See Gallagher, supra note 233, at 1854. 
241Id.  Economists Miceli and Sirmans wrote, “Properly understood, [the holdout problem] 
is a form of monopoly power that potentially arises in the course of land assembly.  Once 
assembly begins, individual owners, knowing their land is essential to the completion of the 
project, can hold out for prices in excess of their opportunity costs.”  Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. 
Sirmans, The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl 1 (Univ. of Conn., Working Paper No. 
2004-38, 2004). 
242
 Gallagher, supra note 233, at 1854.  Legal scholar Richard Epstein has detailed an 
excellent hypothetical that illustrates the problem of holdouts.  Richard A. Epstein, A Clear 
View of The Cathedral:  The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2094 (1997).  
Epstein wrote the following: 
[H]oldout situations arise when the resource currently commanded by A is needed by 
B, such that each can deal only with the other for the useful exchange to take place.  In 
such settings, A may value the thing at 10 and B may value it at 1000, such that it is 
clear that a mutually beneficial voluntary exchange could take place at any sum 
between 11 and 999, but the exact point between the two extremes cannot be 
determined in the abstract, so that the parties labor under strong incentives to hold out 
for the largest fraction of the gain.  At this point, even if the bargain is made, much of 
the surplus (equal to 1000 minus 10, or 990) could be dissipated in achieving it.  
Alternatively, the bargaining process itself could break down. 
Id. 
243Edward W. Hill, Professor and Distinguished Scholar, Cleveland State University Levin 
College of Urban Affairs, Remarks at a Panel Discussion on Citizens’ Rights and 
Government’s Rights Following the Supreme Court’s Decision in Kelo v. City of New London 
(Sept. 8, 2005) (notes on file with the author). 
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developers often must negotiate with several owners, the more attractive private-
sector investment has been to develop rural areas and to leave city neighborhoods 
behind.244  So, in essence, the “optimal location choices of developers [has been] 
systematically biased outward, toward the urban fringe, where land ownership is 
more consolidated and assembly costs are therefore minimized.  The result [has been 
cities] characterized by urban sprawl.”245 
However, a government’s power to use eminent domain can help correct the 
market failure associated with holdouts, so that private developers would be more 
willing to invest in areas with a relatively fragmented ownership, such as aging 
urban neighborhoods.246  Granting local governments the mere authority to condemn 
property in economic development areas prevents individual landowners from 
having an incentive to holdout and to extract excessive market premiums at the 
potential expense of the entire project.247  Essentially, eminent domain levels the 
playing field vis-à-vis rural areas, by giving cities the power to assemble enough 
land to compete for meaningful economic development projects.  As some 
economists have noted, “Seen in this light, urban renewal [through eminent domain] 
is a legitimate . . . public response to a failure in the urban land market.”248 
Consequently, by having the ability to use eminent domain for economic 
development and by utilizing the improved capacity to attract private-sector 
development projects, cities would have a better opportunity to bring people back 
from the suburbs, create much-needed jobs, and generate increased tax revenues.249  
Such economic development projects are integral for the continued viability of older, 
urban areas and could generate a substantial amount of money for essential 
government services. 250  For example, in one notable project, the city of Boston used 
the power of eminent domain to redevelop the Dudley Street Neighborhood, an 
                                                                
244See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 235, at 33-35; Brief of the National League of 
Cities, supra note 237, at 19-21. 
245Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 241, at 8-9. 
246See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 235, at 33-35; Brief of the National League of 
Cities, supra note 237, at 19-21; Gallagher, supra note 233, at 1854-55; Merrill, supra note 
239. 
247See Epstein, supra note 242.  Epstein discussed how eminent domain could address the 
problem of holdouts:   
To prevent the bargaining from breaking down in these contexts, the law could tell one 
person that he is entitled to take the property of another upon payment of just 
compensation, namely, an amount that equals the return he could have gotten for that 
asset in a competitive situation in which that holdout potential is lost. 
Id. at 2094.  
248Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 241, at 9-10. 
249Brief of the National League of Cities, supra note 237. 
250Id. at 18-19.  Government services include “more police officers and firefighters, 
support for senior citizens, better pre-natal care, adolescent pregnancy prevention, more 
teachers and better-equipped schools, and more effective child-abuse prevention.”  Id. at 19; 
see also Dowling, supra note 238. 
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inner-city community that was rapidly declining.251  There, Boston was able to 
condemn properties so that enough land could be assembled for the project,252 which 
has resulted in investments of over $50 million253 and “widely acknowledged 
improvement in the neighborhood.”254  In sum, economic redevelopment projects 
represent an excellent opportunity to spark the revitalization of cities and to reverse 
the trend of increased sprawl.  Yet, because of market failures like the problem with 
holdouts, urban cities need the power of eminent domain, or “these cities cannot 
realistically compete with their less-developed suburban neighbors for economic 
development projects and have little hope of reversing the decline of the past half-
century.”255 
Fortunately, the Court in Kelo implicitly recognized the peril of urban areas and 
allowed local governments to retain the option to use eminent domain for economic 
development under the Fifth Amendment.256  At the end of the majority opinion, the 
Court noted that there was a “legitimate public debate” regarding whether the use of 
eminent domain for economic development was both beneficial and necessary.257  
So, rather than establishing a bright-line rule strictly prohibiting economic 
development takings, the Court made the correct decision, under these factual 
circumstances,258 to defer the issue to the legislative process.  There, Congress, state 
legislatures, and local officials can adequately debate the desirability of this 
governmental power and thoroughly consider all the issues, including, as discussed 
above, how the power of eminent domain can help rectify this country’s growing 
                                                                
251See Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the 
Power of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (1995) (“Once a thriving 
neighborhood with many family-owned businesses and a vital community spirit, Dudley Street 
gradually turned into a wasteland as disinvestment, abandonment and arson took their toll.”); 
David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Make Eminent Domain Fair for All, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 
12, 2005, at A17. 
252See Taylor, supra note 251, at 1080 (“[T]aking the privately owned land by eminent 
domain seemed to DSNI to be the only way to acquire a coherent area of land on which to 
implement its plan.”). 
253Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined:  Revitalizing the Central City with 
Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689, 757 (1994). 
254Barron & Frug, supra note 251. 
255Brief of Connecticut Conference of Municipalities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 17, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 
176426.  Two commentators have stressed that urban cities must take a proactive approach:  
“If communities refrain from adopting aggressive, coordinated growth management strategies, 
development will continue to sprawl across the countryside, because sprawl is a process that 
pits new development areas against old.  As the decay spreads outward, second and third-ring 
suburbs will be affected, and the ‘doughnut hole’ will expand.”  Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 
45, at 197. 
256See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
257Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
258The facts in Kelo indicated that there was no illegitimate purpose for the taking.  See 
discussion supra Parts IV.B.-C. 
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problem with urban sprawl.259  By contrast, if the Court had issued a per se rule 
banning the use of eminent domain for economic development, it would be more 
difficult, merely by judicial fiat, for cities across the nation to overcome the market 
failures challenging urban redevelopment efforts, and there would be one less tool to 
combat sprawl. 
B.  Property Rights Are Still Respected 
Furthermore, contrary to popular opinion and the view of the dissenting justices, 
property rights have not been eviscerated by the Court’s decision in Kelo.260  While 
critics claim that the Court has abdicated its judicial responsibility and has blindly 
authorized governments to condemn all private property for a new Wal-Mart or other 
development, the reality is that the majority opinion followed precedent by correctly 
applying a standard deferential to the legislature, encouraged local governments to 
utilize a fair and transparent process of eminent domain, and maintained a basis for 
an independent level of judicial review.  Thus, as the Court in Kelo preserved the 
tool of eminent domain for urban redevelopment, it also ensured that property rights 
would still be respected. 
First, Kelo does not represent a shift in precedent.261  As discussed earlier, the 
Court has been interpreting the Public Use Clause broadly since the latter half of the 
twentieth century, granting a great deal of deference to legislative determinations of 
what constitutes a “public use.”262  This policy reflects the notion that local elected 
officials, with the advantages of the legislative process, can better decide whether 
governmental takings will benefit the public, as opposed to unelected federal 
judges.263  In Kelo, the Court merely reaffirmed this longstanding rule of judicial 
deference and thereby supported the city of New London’s determination that its use 
of eminent domain was justified.264 
However, the majority opinion’s championing of the policy of judicial deference 
does not mean that local governments have been given a free pass to use eminent 
domain at their blind discretion.  Instead, the Court has shifted the issue of economic 
development takings to the political arena and has given legislatures and local 
governments a greater responsibility to ensure that eminent domain is used 
appropriately and with adequate safeguards.  As the Court recognized in Kelo, the 
                                                                
259In fact, the Court hinted that the legislative debate should address the holdout problem 
when Justice Stevens recognized in a footnote that commentators have argued “the need for 
eminent domain is especially great with regard to older, small cities like New London, where 
centuries of development have created an extreme overdivision of land and thus a real market 
impediment to land assembly.”  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 n.24. 
260See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
261See Lora A. Lucero, Commentary, Kelo v. City of New London, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., 
July 2005, at 11, reprinted in AM. PLANNING ASS’N, REPORT NO. 535, THE FOUR SUPREME 
COURT LAND-USE DECISIONS OF 2005: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION 68 (2005).  The 
American Planning Association’s text is a great source that contains a great deal of 
information about Kelo and is highly recommended for any interested reader.  
262See discussion supra Part III.B. 
263See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487-88. 
264See id. at 484. 
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use of eminent domain often involves hardship and thus should be used as a last 
resort and only when absolutely necessary.265  Consequently, the Court stressed with 
approval how the city of New London initiated the takings as a result of a 
comprehensive redevelopment plan and only after every effort was made to purchase 
the unsold properties.266  Likewise, legislatures and other local governments should 
follow the city of New London’s lead in formulating and executing their own 
redevelopment projects.  Elected officials must realize that eminent domain is 
inappropriate in certain situations, such as when a developer does not engage in 
good-faith negotiations with property owners, or when a majority of landowners 
within a proposed redevelopment site do not wish to sell at any price.  Legislatures 
and local governments should strive to ensure that the process of eminent domain is 
not tainted by an illegitimate purpose and is completed in an open and just manner 
for the benefit of all American citizens. 
Furthermore, despite skepticism by the dissents and other commentators, the 
average local government official is not a “corrupt money-grubber”267 but will in fact 
strive to protect each of his or her constituents from being subjected to an improper 
use of eminent domain.268  Yet, should an elected official support an egregious use of 
eminent domain, the Court in Kelo still provides any affected constituents with an 
opportunity to seek meaningful review.  While the Court determined that a 
deferential standard should apply in cases involving the Public Use Clause, the 
majority opinion placed a strong emphasis on the factual circumstances of the case to 
reach its conclusion that New London’s takings satisfied a “public purpose.”269  In 
addition, in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy pointed out five factors from the 
underlying facts of the case that he felt justified New London’s use of eminent 
domain.270  So, while critics suggest that the Court’s opinion in Kelo has essentially 
authorized any taking, a close reading of the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence indicates that the Court actually has imposed procedural limits on how 
local governments can constitutionally use eminent domain for economic 
development.  Therefore, contrary to Justice O’Connor’s view, the Court has still 
reserved a role for itself as a final guardian of property rights as “[a]n external, 
judicial check”271 on the actions of legislatures and local governments, such that only 
takings pursuant to a carefully considered and comprehensive economic 
development plan will be adjudged to satisfy the Fifth Amendment. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In Kelo, the Court faced a difficult dilemma.  On the one hand, property owners 
like Mrs. Dery stood to lose their homes.  On the other hand, the city of New London 
was an economically distressed city losing residents and jobs.  However, as pointed 
                                                                
265See id. at 489. 
266See id. at 478. 
267Dowling, supra note 238, at 55. 
268See id. 
269See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
270See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
271Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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out by New London’s lead counsel, “This case was not some type of land grab.  This 
case was about the City of New London, its six square miles and its economic 
survival.”272  Likewise, from a national perspective, Kelo should not be viewed as a 
violation of property rights but a decision that allows urban cities like New London 
and Lakewood to compete against sprawling suburbs and gradually reduce sprawl. 
The proliferation of urban sprawl in the United States is an enormous challenge 
facing the country.  In part because of various government policies, there has been a 
steady stream of people and jobs moving from central cities to the edges of 
metropolitan areas, leaving an ever-expanding void in the core of urban 
communities.  This trend has been augmented by market failures such as the problem 
with holdouts that systematically encourage developers to construct commercial and 
residential projects at the undeveloped fringes of major cities.  Thus, to effectively 
combat sprawl, proactive government solutions are needed.   
One solution, if used properly and with adequate procedural safeguards, is for 
cities to use the power of eminent domain for economic development.  This 
governmental power neutralizes the holdout problem and allows central cities and 
inner-ring suburbs to compete for development projects on an equal footing with 
rural communities.  In Kelo, by ruling in favor of New London and establishing that 
cities did have the power to initiate economic development takings, the Court 
implicitly recognized this dynamic.  While many believe that the Court has 
overstepped its constitutional boundaries in affirming this use of eminent domain and 
has subsequently endangered private property rights, the majority opinion in Kelo 
ultimately still ensures that property rights will be respected. It also, more 
importantly, defends a city’s right to use eminent domain for economic development, 
which correspondingly can help diminish urban sprawl. 
So, as legislators respond to the perceived loss of private property rights under 
Kelo and rush to enact prohibitive bright-line rules, Congress and state leaders must 
recognize the effect of such prohibitions and realize how holdouts can thwart a 
community’s attempt to improve.  Even though the Court in Kelo “emphasize[d] that 
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its 
exercise of the takings power,”273 lawmakers should construe the Court’s suggestion 
as an opportunity to address legitimate property right concerns, rather than to hastily 
enact a complete ban of the use of eminent domain for economic development.  
Urban sprawl is a major problem in our country, and legislators should follow the 
Court’s implicit lead in preserving the power of eminent domain as a tool to combat 
the growth of sprawl. 
                                                                
272Salzman & Mansnerus, supra note 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Thomas J. Londregan). 
273Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
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